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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the government has 
increasingly relied upon the federal material witness statute to arrest and 
detain persons with knowledge of or connections to suspected terrorists.1  
Of these detentions, the arrest of Abdullah al-Kidd was one of the most 
publicized in the media, primarily due to his subsequent lawsuit against 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft.  His case made national headlines 
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear it.2  Although the appeal 
only challenged the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision regarding 
1. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) (permitting the detention of a person with
material testimony whose presence may be impracticable to secure by subpoena); 
Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of “Hold Until Cleared”: Reexamining 
Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 677, 695, 702 (2005) (noting that the use of the federal material witness statute 
since September 11, 2001, has been unprecedented). 
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Material Witness Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/us/politics/21witness.html 
(describing the case as the only major national security case of the 2011 Supreme Court 
term). 
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Ashcroft’s immunity from liability, the ensuing debate centered heavily 
upon the propriety of the government’s use of the federal material witness 
statute to detain suspected terrorists rather than actual witnesses. 
Al-Kidd’s central allegation was that Ashcroft had developed a policy to 
circumvent ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements through use of the 
federal material witness statute.3  The Supreme Court eventually rejected 
al-Kidd’s suit on the basis that Ashcroft enjoyed immunity from liability.4  
In unusual fashion, however, the Court went beyond ordinary judicial 
procedure by also holding that no Fourth Amendment violation had even 
occurred, despite the lack of effect of the additional holding on the outcome 
of the case.5  This Comment argues that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
the pretextual use of the material witness statute to preemptively detain 
criminal suspects for whom ordinary criminal arrest would be impossible. 
Part II reviews the federal material witness statute and the exceptions made 
in the law for special needs cases.  After providing an overview of al-
Kidd’s case against the government, it then introduces concepts of feminist 
theory and dignity ethics relevant to the social impact of the Fourth 
Amendment ruling against al-Kidd.6  Part III contends that the Supreme 
Court should not have addressed the Fourth Amendment issues because 
they were not determinative to the outcome of the case and further argues 
that the material witness statute falls within the special needs search and 
seizure line of case law.7  Part IV then proposes policy rationales for 
prohibiting the use of the material witness statute to detain criminal 
suspects based on insights from feminist theory and dignity ethics.8  
Finally, Part V concludes that the Court’s holding in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd 
will have negative effects on the social and legal perception of witness 
3. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (Al-Kidd II), 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2009)
(reiterating al-Kidd’s allegations of misuse of the statute to arrest suspects for whom 
sufficient evidence did not exist to arrest on criminal charges). 
4. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (Al-Kidd III), 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding
Ashcroft immune as he did not violate “clearly established law”). 
5. Compare id. at 2083 (defending the resolution of the Fourth Amendment claim
and finding no constitutional violation), with id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
judgment) (criticizing the majority opinion for resolving a novel claim that had no 
effect on the outcome of the case). 
6. See infra Part II (discussing the historical importance of dignity in the law and
the ethical considerations necessitated by material witness arrests). 
7. See infra Part III (arguing, in part, that the reasonableness of a material witness
arrest should account for underlying programmatic purposes to prevent against 
potential abuse). 
8. See infra Part IV (applying feminist and ethical considerations to analyze the
implications of the pretextual use of the material witness statute on the ability of the 
individual to constitute a dignified identity). 
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cooperation. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Material Witness Statute 
The federal material witness statute permits the arrest of a person who 
appears to be material in a criminal proceeding and whose presence may be 
impracticable to secure at a trial or deposition.9  Material witness statutes 
are meant to aid prosecutors in the gathering of important information 
against a criminal, and thus allow for the arrest of an individual who is not 
suspected of a crime.  Despite the unique situation presented by the arrest 
of individuals for the purpose of testimony, material witness arrests are 
subject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements because 
they are seizures within the meaning of the Constitution.10  Therefore, a 
material witness arrest warrant must establish probable cause that the 
statutory requirements are satisfied.11 
Material witness arrest warrants, however, do not involve ordinary 
probable cause that a person is suspected of criminal wrongdoing because 
the witness is only held to secure testimony.12  The modification of the 
probable cause requirement consequently changes other aspects of the 
warrant and arrest procedure for material witnesses, often lowering the 
burden on the government in comparison to ordinary criminal arrests.  For 
example, Miranda warnings are not required for an incarcerated witness.13  
Additionally, the establishment of materiality requires only a representation 
by a “responsible official,” such as a federal prosecutor.14 
B. Opinion and History of the al-Kidd Decision 
In 2006, Abdullah al-Kidd brought suit against former Attorney General 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012).
10. See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting any
distinctions separating the material witness statute from the procedural dictates of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
11. See id. (requiring probable cause for establishing both the materiality of the
testimony and the impracticability of securing the witness’s presence by subpoena). 
12. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that probable cause for material witness arrest warrants differs from the 
ordinary arrest warrant, which is based on suspicion that the arrestee has committed a 
crime). 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1976).
14. See Bacon, 449 F.2d at 943 (determining that a mere statement by a
responsible official is sufficient for the statute, at least in the context of grand jury 
proceedings). 
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John Ashcroft and several Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents. 
He alleged, among other claims, violations of the federal material witness 
statute and the Fourth Amendment.15  Al-Kidd was arrested pursuant to the 
statute for allegedly being a material witness in the federal grand jury case 
against Sami Omar Al-Hussayen.16  After sixteen days of confinement, al-
Kidd was released from custody but required to limit his travel and report 
regularly to a probation officer.17  Al-Kidd was never called as a witness in 
any criminal proceeding.18 
Al-Kidd alleged that, under a policy implemented by former Attorney 
General Ashcroft, the government abused the material witness statute to 
pretextually arrest him as a witness when the government actually detained 
him as a terrorism suspect.19  Al-Kidd supported his claims with statements 
by government officials that purported to show a programmatic intent to 
use the material witness statute to preemptively detain terrorism suspects 
who could not otherwise be arrested under criminal statutes.20  Al-Kidd 
also provided details of alleged misrepresentations and omissions in the 
warrant application used to secure his arrest.21 
The Idaho District Court rejected Ashcroft’s motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that al-Kidd alleged the direct involvement of 
Ashcroft in establishing a policy to misuse the material witness statute by 
pretextually detaining individuals suspected of a crime.22  The district court 
also rejected the motion for summary judgment by the federal agents who 
15. See al-Kidd v. Gonzales (Al-Kidd I), No. CV:05-093-S-EJL, 2006 WL
5429570, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2006). 
16. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
17. See id. at 951-52 (describing the conditions of al-Kidd’s conditional release,
which limited his movement to four states and required meetings with a probation 
officer for the next fifteen months). 
18. See id. at 954 (noting the failure to use al-Kidd in Al-Hussayan’s trial or any
other proceeding). 
19. Id. at 952.
20. See id. at 954-55 (providing quotes from al-Kidd’s complaint by government
officials, including Ashcroft, who referenced the use of material witness warrants to 
aggressively combat terrorism through the apprehension of terrorism suspects). 
21. See id. at 953 (detailing inaccuracies and omissions in the warrant affidavit,
including representing his $1,700 round-trip coach ticket as a $5,000 one-way first 
class ticket, and failing to mention either al-Kidd’s or his family’s U.S. citizenship and 
residency or al-Kidd’s previous cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI)). 
22. See al-Kidd I, No. CV:05-093-S-EJL, 2006 WL 5429570, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept.
27, 2006) (noting that the alleged policy was to preventively detain and investigate 
terrorism suspects for whom probable cause for criminal arrest could not be 
established). 
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obtained and reviewed the material witness warrant, finding that qualified 
immunity would not apply to the agents based on the facts alleged by al-
Kidd.23 
Only Ashcroft appealed the district court’s denial of summary dismissal, 
and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s holding in large part.24  The 
appellate court held Ashcroft liable for the arrest of al-Kidd, reasoning that 
al-Kidd’s allegations included objective indicia that the arrest was related 
to criminal investigation or detention rather than to securing witness 
testimony.25  The court considered the programmatic purpose underlying 
the use of the material witness statute after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the basis that material witness arrests were not ordinary Fourth 
Amendment seizures.26  The court reasoned that the prohibition against 
inquiry into programmatic motivation only applies for arrests accompanied 
by ordinary probable cause, while material witness arrests do not involve 
suspicion of wrongdoing.27  The court then denied Ashcroft qualified 
immunity for the alleged policy through a lengthy discussion of the ways 
that the Attorney General was on notice that his programmatic use of the 
statute violated the Fourth Amendment.28  Finally, the court rejected the 
liability of Ashcroft for the treatment of al-Kidd during his detention, 
which distinguished its holding from that of the district court.29  However, 
the court did admonish the treatment of witnesses in confinement as similar 
to the punishment of criminals.30 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected all liability 
for Ashcroft, finding him to possess qualified immunity because the right 
allegedly violated was not clearly established.31  The Court rejected the 
23. See id. at *8-9 (holding that the allegations of misrepresentation and omission
in the warrant application prevented the application of qualified immunity). 
24. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 977, 979 (finding Ashcroft liable for al-Kidd’s
arrest, but not liable for his treatment during confinement). 
25. See id. at 963-64 (highlighting various investigatory aspects of al-Kidd’s
arrest, including that al-Kidd never actually testified as a witness). 
26. See id. at 968.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 975-76 (detailing several instances of publicity regarding the abuse
of the material witness statute). 
29. See id. at 978-79 (providing an overview of the abuse al-Kidd allegedly
suffered during his confinement, but rejecting the claim for liability as deficient). 
30. See id. at 953, 977 (recognizing a governmental obligation to not treat
witnesses as criminals and describing the conditions of al-Kidd’s incarceration, which 
included imprisonment in high-security units of detention facilities, multiple strip 
searches, a cell that was kept lit twenty-four hours a day, and permission to leave the 
cell for only one to two hours each day). 
31. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (2011).
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reasoning of the lower courts as insufficient to negate qualified immunity.32  
The Court then proceeded to rule on the alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation, although the resolution of this issue was not determinative to the 
outcome of the decision.33  The Court recognized that special needs and 
administrative search and seizure cases were exceptions to the general 
prohibition on inquiry into motivating intent, but the majority determined 
that these cases rested on a lack of individualized suspicion and were thus 
inapplicable to al-Kidd’s circumstances.34 
The Court’s reasoning on the Fourth Amendment issue rested on the 
presumption that al-Kidd had conceded that individualized suspicion 
existed in the warrant application.35  This presumption, however, was 
contested in concurring opinions.36  Even Justice Kennedy, who joined the 
majority opinion in full, felt obliged to observe that the holding did not 
resolve whether the use of the material witness statute against al-Kidd was 
lawful.37  Justice Kennedy also cautioned that the ordinary Fourth 
Amendment warrant procedure might not be applicable to a material 
witness arrest warrant because of the differences in the meaning of 
suspicion.38  Concurring in the judgment, Justice Ginsburg and Justice 
Sotomayor were more critical of the possible breadth of the majority’s 
opinion, finding it unnecessary and unjustified.39  Justice Ginsburg also 
disputed the presumption that the warrant application was based on 
individualized suspicion, reasoning that “suspicion” is a term with specific 
32. Id.
33. See id. at 2080 (determining the resolution of the Fourth Amendment claim to
be appropriate in ensuring that qualified immunity is not undermined by lower courts 
even though the holding would have no effect on the outcome of the case). 
34. See id. at 2080-82 (finding that the material witness warrant for al-Kidd
contained “individualized reasons” regarding al-Kidd’s detention). 
35. See id. at 2082 (finding an admittance of individualized suspicion on the basis
that al-Kidd conceded the affidavit contained individualized reasons). 
36. See, e.g., id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (addressing
several deficiencies in the warrant affidavit). 
37. See id. at 2085-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the majority’s
holding is limited to the legal theories presented to the Court and does not resolve the 
lawfulness of the arrest). 
38. See id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that ordinary probable
cause is based on suspicion of criminality). 
39. See id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (objecting to the
disposition of the Fourth Amendment claim given the omissions and 
misrepresentations in the warrant application); id. at 2089-90 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in judgment) (criticizing the majority’s opinion for unnecessarily resolving 
the novel Fourth Amendment claim through use of unsupported assumptions). 
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legal meaning that refers to “suspicion of wrongdoing.”40 
Following the disposition of the Supreme Court concerning al-Kidd’s 
claims against Ashcroft, the Idaho District Court granted al-Kidd’s motion 
for summary judgment against the federal agent who prepared the material 
witness arrest warrant affidavit on the basis of the affidavit’s deficiencies.41  
In contrast, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
agent who reviewed the warrant application.42 
C. Special Needs Searches and Seizures 
Administrative, or special needs, searches and seizures are those whose 
primary objective programmatic purpose is not related to a general interest 
in criminal law enforcement.43  Both the warrant and probable cause 
requirements can be modified in administrative searches and seizures, 
including those related to individualized suspicion and a reasonable belief 
that a suspect is committing a crime.44  The special needs of the 
government provide an exception to these requirements in various 
particular contexts, with the involvement of law enforcement not being 
determinative.45 
Although Whren v. United States generally prohibits inquiry into 
subjective motivating intent, special needs cases allow for inquiry into 
40. See id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the legal
meaning of the term suspicion is not genuinely debatable). 
41. See al-Kidd v. Gonzales (Al-Kidd IV), No. 1:05-cv-093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL
4470776, at *3, 6 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012) (holding that the agent improperly 
misrepresented the truth and recklessly omitted crucial information from the affidavit). 
42. See id. at *11 (finding that the reviewing agent acted reasonably because he
had no knowledge of the deficiencies). 
43. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001) (recognizing that
the special needs requisite to establish an administrative purpose are separate from 
general law enforcement interests); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 
(2000) (prohibiting roadblocks that “primarily serve the general interest in crime 
control”). 
44. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (recognizing that
special needs may permit departure from the usual warrant and probable cause 
requirements); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (noting that special needs have 
allowed for the suspension of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause 
requirements). 
45. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (information-seeking
roadblock), Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (drunk driver 
roadblocks); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of 
adults in safety-sensitive work contexts); Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (probationers); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (national border control); South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory searches); Camara v. Municipal Court of
the City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (safety inspections). 
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objective programmatic purposes.46  When a search or seizure has dual 
purposes, the special needs exception applies if the primary purpose is not 
related to criminal law enforcement.47  This inquiry into programmatic 
purpose precludes the use of an alleged administrative purpose from being 
used as a pretext to avoid the usual probable cause and warrant 
requirements.48  Therefore, the immediate objective of a search or seizure 
cannot be a general crime control purpose but must have an actual 
administrative purpose.49 
A general interest in criminal law enforcement does not include all 
government action that relates to crime control but only those situations 
within the ordinary activity of law enforcement.50  Ordinary Fourth 
Amendment searches and seizures involve ascertaining evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing based on individualized suspicion, while the special 
needs exception applies when the primary purpose of the intrusion goes 
beyond an interest in ordinary criminal wrongdoing to an administrative 
concern.51  Further, the Court has distinguished between the purpose of 
uncovering criminal wrongdoing of the searched or seized person and the 
purpose of eliciting information from that person to incriminate another.52  
Indeed, in Illinois v. Lidster, the Court specifically determined the special 
needs exception applies to seizures with the purpose of eliciting 
46. Compare Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) (rejecting
inquiry into subjective motivations of individual officers), with Edmond, 531 U.S. at 
45-46 (allowing inquiry into programmatic purpose for searches justified by special 
needs). 
47. Compare Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42 (prohibiting roadblocks for narcotic
interdiction because the primary purpose was detecting evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing), with Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469 (allowing for the seizure of vehicles at 
roadblocks to check for drunk driving due to the public safety concern). 
48. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 (holding that the pretextual use of routine
medical treatment to obtain evidence for the purpose of incriminating patients violates 
the Fourth Amendment); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-12 (explaining that an 
administrative purpose cannot be used as pretext to avoid the need for probable cause 
when the purpose for the search is not administrative). 
49. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 (rejecting government invocation of the special
needs exception when the purpose of a search was primarily to generate evidence for 
use by law enforcement). 
50. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (recognizing that a high level of generality in
contextualizing the purpose of roadblocks could permit roadblocks for any conceivable 
law enforcement purpose). 
51. See id. at 41-42 (noting that the purpose of a narcotic interdiction roadblock is
merely to discover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing). 
52. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (distinguishing a roadblock
designed to discover witnesses to a crime from one meant to determine whether the 
occupants of a vehicle were involved in criminality). 
9
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information from potential witnesses of a crime because the primary 
purpose is not a general interest in crime control.53 
D. Feminist Theory and Dignity Ethics 
Supreme Court jurisprudence increasingly relies upon dignity as a basis 
for decisions, with a trend of rising use since the twentieth century.54  
When combined with the feminist theory insight that social context is 
constitutive of the broader meaningful world, dignity within the law 
becomes significant to establishing individual identity.55  To avoid 
jeopardizing the realization of the self, the legal system should appreciate 
the effects of the law on dignity.56 
The government’s power to arrest individuals solely for witnessing a 
crime permits treatment of these individuals that differs from ordinary 
noncriminal citizens.  Given this governmental power, courts have a 
manifest obligation to consider the ethical implications of the use of the 
material witness statute.57  The Supreme Court frequently invokes dignity 
when analyzing claims of discrimination, where the assertion of inferiority 
through differential treatment has no justifiable basis.58  Additionally, the 
Court has relied upon dignity to protect the reputations of ordinary citizens 
53. See id. at 424 (holding that information-seeking vehicular roadblocks are
permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the target of criminal interest is not 
the vehicle’s occupant). 
54. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
169, 179 (2011) (providing statistical analysis of increasing invocation of the term 
dignity since 1946). 
55. See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 183, 188 (2011) (characterizing identity as dependent upon the relation 
between dignity and the law); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: 
Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4-5, 17 (2002) (describing the individual as constituted 
by the relationship to society, the world, and the law). 
56. See Henry, supra note 54, at 208, 246-49 (expressing the contingency of
identity on the recognition of dignity, including recognition by the state as the 
embodiment of community norms); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 
(2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(plurality opinion)) (relating personal dignity to the ability to “define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”). 
57. See Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or
Denied?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1565 (1994) (characterizing material witness arrests 
as an intimidating aspect of our justice system that demands the implementation of 
ethical considerations). 
58. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (holding
that exclusions from jury selection based solely on gender are offensive to personal 
dignity). 
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against defamation.59  Through these decisions, the Court expresses the 
centrality of dignity in the constitution of individual identity, with an 
emphasis on the recognition of dignity under the law.60  Further, the Fourth 
Amendment, by prohibiting unreasonable government seizures, guarantees 
respect for the dignity of persons.61 
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court in al-Kidd, by Ruling on a Novel Fourth Amendment Claim 
Without Consideration of the Facts, Did Not Exhibit Sufficient 
Appreciation for Its Fourth Amendment Holding. 
The majority opinion characterized the Fourth Amendment claim 
broadly, based on presumed admissions by al-Kidd, as whether an arrest 
unconstitutionally violates Fourth Amendment reasonableness when the 
warrant is objectively valid but based on improper intent.62  With this broad 
interpretation of the allegation, the majority was able to find the holding of 
Whren v. United States controlling, and thus prohibited inquiry into the 
motivating intent underlying a material witness arrest.63  The majority 
bolstered its reliance on Whren by appealing to City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond to demonstrate that al-Kidd’s case was not a special needs case. 
While Edmond allowed inquiry into motivating purpose, the majority 
distinguished the lack of individualized suspicion in Edmond from the lack 
59. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (quoting
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)) (finding that dignity protects personal 
reputation from unjustified invasion). 
60. See Rao, supra note 55, at 188-89 (referencing prohibitions against
discrimination and defamation to exemplify the societal and legal input into identity as 
it relates to conceptions of dignity).  Without the recognition of dignity in the law, the 
individual loses the ability to realize that part of identity constituted by the law and the 
legal system. 
61. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989)
(finding that the Fourth Amendment guarantees the dignity of persons, along with their 
privacy and security, against certain arbitrary acts by the government). 
62. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2075, 2080, 2085 (2011) (characterizing the holding
of the Court as addressing only the effect of improper motive upon the reasonableness 
of a material witness arrest). 
63. See id. at 2082-83 (applying Whren to determine that the analysis of
reasonableness in material witness arrest cases prohibits consideration of alleged 
pretext).  In Whren, an allegedly pretextual stop of an automobile for illegal drug-
dealing activity was found to be constitutional because valid probable cause existed for 
the stop.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996).  The Court rejected the 
use of subjective motives to invalidate a stop otherwise justifiable by probable cause. 
Id. at 813-15 (noting the difficulty of analyzing subjective motives). 
11
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of probably cause allegedly challenged by al-Kidd.64 
The majority’s reliance on Edmond and Whren was dependent upon the 
presumption that al-Kidd conceded a validly obtained warrant based on 
individualized suspicion because the majority interpreted a lack of 
individualized suspicion as essential to the special needs exception.65  The 
justices who concurred in the judgment severely questioned this 
presumption by the majority because they felt the facts of the case 
presented serious issues surrounding the validity of the warrant.66  The 
concurrences in judgment by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor 
identified the Fourth Amendment issue as inextricably intertwined with the 
particularities of al-Kidd’s arrest and detention, especially regarding the 
deficiencies of the warrant.67  The actual facts undermined the premises 
that confined the majority’s Fourth Amendment analysis.  Consequently, 
the justices concurring in the judgment characterized the majority’s holding 
on the Fourth Amendment issue as narrow because of the limitations of the 
majority’s analysis.68  If the majority had sufficiently appreciated the 
factual difficulties surrounding al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim, then it 
would have been unable to reach such a broad resolution of the issue on the 
merits. 
64. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080-82 (distinguishing the lack of individualized
suspicion in Edmond from the lack of probable cause allegedly challenged by al-Kidd). 
The holding in Edmond relied on the lack of individualized suspicion, while the 
holding in Whren relied on its existence.  The majority, after assuming al-Kidd’s 
admission of valid individualized suspicion, relied on that assumption to distinguish 
Edmond and follow Whren.  See id. at 2082-83. 
65. See id.
66. See id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (finding persuasive
reasons to question the majority’s initial presumption because of the omissions and 
misrepresentations contained in the warrant affidavit).  The affidavit did not inform the 
issuing judge of several aspects of the case, including that al-Kidd previously 
cooperated with the FBI, that al-Kidd’s parents, wife, and children all had U.S. 
citizenship and residency, or the particular information al-Kidd possessed or how it was 
material to a prosecution.  See id. at 2087-88, 2088 n.2.  The affidavit also 
misrepresented al-Kidd’s $1,700 round-trip coach flight to Saudi Arabia as a $5,000 
one-way first-class ticket.  Id. at 2088. 
67. Within the context of the Fourth Amendment question, Justice Ginsburg
addressed the deficiencies of the warrant and the treatment of al-Kidd during his 
detention.  See id. at 2087-89.  Similarly, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s 
presentation of the Fourth Amendment issue as “artificial” and qualified it with 
references to al-Kidd’s prolonged detention and the warrant’s deficiencies.  Id. at 2090 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment). 
68. See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (describing the
majority’s ruling as a narrow one based on questionable premises and without 
sufficient appreciation of the actual facts). 
12
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1. The Court Did Not Need to Address the Fourth Amendment Claim
Because the Resolution of the Issue Did Not Affect the Outcome of the 
Case. 
Judicial convention cautions against resolving constitutional issues that 
do not affect the outcome of a case.69  Courts risk unnecessarily wasting 
judicial resources as well as creating precedent based on limited 
interpretations of difficult constitutional questions.70  The Court in al-Kidd, 
however, resolved al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim despite the outcome 
of the case being determined by the issue of qualified immunity.71 
The precedential value of the Fourth Amendment determination in al-
Kidd remains unclear because of the inconsistency within the language of 
the opinions.72  Although the majority classifies the Fourth Amendment 
determination as a holding, it recognizes that the holding does not affect the 
outcome of the case.73  Because all the opinions agree that the issue was not 
determinative to the outcome of the case, the most appropriate 
classification of its resolution would be dicta.74  Indeed, Part I of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, which was joined by the three justices who did not 
join the majority opinion, attempts to limit the holding of the Court’s 
majority to addressing only the legal theory before the Court.75 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, made particular effort in his majority 
opinion to justify the departure from usual judicial convention.76  The 
69. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009) (expressing hesitation
regarding the determination of novel constitutional claims when they are irrelevant to 
the determination of the broader case). 
70. See id. at 236, 238, 241 (reviewing the potential defects of judicial decisions
based on avoidable determinations). 
71. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
question is not determinative to the case, but concluding that its resolution is required 
to prevent lower courts from slowly undermining the values of qualified immunity). 
72. See id. at 2080, 2085 (referring to the Fourth Amendment determination as a
holding, but one that does not affect the outcome of the case); id. at 2088 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in judgment) (describing to the Fourth Amendment holding as a 
determination on the merits, but criticizing it as improper). 
73. See id. at 2080 (majority opinion) (suggesting the determination prohibits
future constitutional challenges). 
74. See id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (classifying the issue as
novel and its resolution as unnecessary).  But see id. at 2085 (majority opinion) 
(presenting the Fourth Amendment determination as limiting subsequent constitutional 
challenges). 
75. See id. at 2085-86 (stating that the limited Fourth Amendment determination
did not resolve whether the use of the material witness statute against al-Kidd was 
lawful). 
76. See id. at 2080 (discussing his reasons for addressing the Fourth Amendment
violation). 
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majority relied upon Pearson in granting itself the discretion to decide the 
Fourth Amendment claim even though the determination of qualified 
immunity resolved the case on its own.77  Despite the admitted novelty and 
difficulty of the Fourth Amendment claim, the majority felt obligated to 
resolve the issue and thus prevent erroneous constitutional determinations 
from obtaining precedential value in lower courts.78 
The opinions concurring in the judgment relied upon the passage in 
Pearson to criticize the resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue, in spite 
of the majority’s justifications.79  The issue was too novel and unnecessary 
for a satisfactory precedential holding, especially given the serious factual 
difficulties present in the case.80  However, as a result of the majority’s 
asserted holding, material witnesses may now be unable to challenge their 
arrest based on pretextual motivation. 
2. The Court Failed to Consider the Deficiencies of the Warrant Because It
Based Its Conclusions on Presumptions Unwarranted by the Facts. 
When resolving a motion to dismiss, courts must accept the factual 
allegations of the nonmoving party as true.81  In al-Kidd, the majority 
opinion accepts this dictate but then only provides a cursory description of 
the facts alleged by al-Kidd, whose complaint was being challenged by 
Ashcroft.82  When analyzing al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim, the 
majority then entirely omits any discussion of al-Kidd’s factual allegations 
against Ashcroft.83  Although the majority did not explicitly reject al-
77. See id. (circumventing its recognition that cautious thought is required before
resolving issues unnecessary to the outcome of the case); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (permitting court discretion to resolve qualified immunity 
claims by addressing both the alleged constitutional violation and the clearly 
established standard, or only the latter). 
78. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (expressing concern about the insulation of
judgments on novel constitutional issues). 
79. See, e.g., al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in judgment)
(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37) (relying on Pearson to object to the majority’s 
Fourth Amendment holding as unnecessary). 
80. See id. at 2089-90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (condemning the
majority’s ruling as narrow, unnecessary, and questionable, especially in light of the 
alleged facts). 
81. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)) (holding that factual allegations must be 
assumed true unless they are mere conclusions); see also al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 
(stating an intention to accept the factual allegations in al-Kidd’s complaint as true). 
82. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (mentioning briefly Ashcroft’s alleged
policy, the apprehension of al-Kidd, and the length of al-Kidd’s confinement and 
supervised release). 
83. See id. at 2080-83 (failing to mention a single factual allegation, and providing
14
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Kidd’s allegations, its opinion ignored them and their impact on the issues. 
The majority should have considered the facts of the case in its opinion to 
ensure appreciation for al-Kidd’s situation and awareness of the stigma that 
al-Kidd was trying to avoid.84  The failures of the warrant affidavit 
deprived al-Kidd of his due process and characterized him as a possible 
suspected terrorist.  The majority should have included these facts, which 
were support for al-Kidd’s claim against Ashcroft, and which showed the 
possible abuse that material witness arrests pose. 
In addition to omitting the factual allegations of al-Kidd’s complaint 
from its discussion, the majority introduces its own deductions to defeat al-
Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim.  The majority uses the presumption that 
al-Kidd had conceded the warrant was suspected by individualized 
suspicion to find no Fourth Amendment violation.85  The majority’s 
reasoning is that al-Kidd’s acknowledgement of individualized reasons in 
the warrant affidavit means al-Kidd conceded that the warrant for his arrest 
was based on individualized suspicion.86  The majority thus equates 
“individualized reasons” for the belief that al-Kidd was a material witness 
with the existence of “individualized suspicion.”87  On the basis of this 
presumption of properly individualized suspicion, the majority proceeds to 
infer a validly obtained warrant, even stating in a footnote that the validity 
of the warrant was the premise of al-Kidd’s argument.88  The majority 
concludes its opinion by appealing to the validity of the warrant as a central 
premise in its Fourth Amendment holding.89 
The justices concurring in the judgment justifiably criticized the logic of 
the majority’s presumptions concerning al-Kidd’s concessions in his 
complaint.90  The complaint alleged that the affidavit accompanying the 
warrant application contained numerous omissions and 
only that al-Kidd alleged he was detained as a suspected criminal). 
84. Cf. al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that al-Kidd has been
unemployed due to the inability to obtain a security clearance as a result of his arrest). 
85. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
86. See id. at 2082.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 2083 n.3 (asserting that al-Kidd accepts the validity of the warrant by
seeking to hold Ashcroft liable for the improper motive of the material witness arrest 
policy). 
89. See id. at 2085 (stating that an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant cannot be
challenged on the basis of improper motive). 
90. See id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (applying the factual
allegations in al-Kidd’s complaint to question the possibility of a validly obtained 
warrant). 
15
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misrepresentations.91  Further, the majority omits al-Kidd’s case against the 
FBI Special Agents, which challenged the validity of the warrant and 
resulted in a finding of recklessness for the affidavit errors.92  The failure of 
the majority to consider these aspects of al-Kidd’s case prevented the 
judicial process from considering the full context of his situation and its 
effect on his identity. 
The factual allegations in the complaint, along with the suit against the 
Special Agents, are inconsistent with a concession that the warrant for al-
Kidd’s arrest was validly obtained.93  The majority, however, omits these 
facts from its discussion, causing a disconnect between the actual facts and 
the majority’s presumptions as well as a lack of clarity concerning the 
majority’s perspective.94  Although al-Kidd sought to hold Ashcroft liable 
for a policy of improperly arresting terrorism suspects as material 
witnesses, al-Kidd did not premise this claim on the validity of the 
warrant.95  Instead, al-Kidd alleged that an aspect of the policy 
implemented by Ashcroft was to arrest material witnesses even when the 
requirements of the material witness statute were not met.96  Further, al-
Kidd contended that his arrest was a direct result of this aspect of the 
policy, and did so with sufficient force that the Ninth Circuit allowed this 
claim to proceed against Ashcroft.97  The presumptions made by a majority 
of the Supreme Court are irreconcilable in light of these factual allegations 
made by al-Kidd and do not exhibit sufficient appreciation for his situation. 
The justices who did not join the majority opinion questioned the initial 
91. See id. (reiterating the allegations of a deficient warrant, including the
affidavit’s claim that al-Kidd was taking a $5,000 one-way first class ticket to Saudi 
Arabia when he was actually taking a $1,700 round-trip coach ticket and its failure to 
include the U.S. residency and citizenship of al-Kidd and his family or al-Kidd’s 
previous repeated cooperation with the FBI). 
92. See al-Kidd IV, No. 1:05-cv-093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL 4470776, at *6 (D.
Idaho Sept. 27, 2012) (granting summary judgment against the FBI agent who prepared 
the warrant application due to the agent’s reckless disregard for the truth). 
93. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2088-89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that the validity of the warrant is severely undermined both by the allegations 
in al-Kidd’s complaint and by his continuing claims against the Special Agents). 
94. See id. at 2087 (characterizing the presumptions made by the majority
regarding a validly obtained warrant as “puzzling”). 
95. See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing that the
validity of the warrant was severely questioned even as al-Kidd sought to hold Ashcroft 
liable for the alleged policy). 
96. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
97. See id. at 977 (finding the claim plausible on the basis of the allegations in al-
Kidd’s complaint). 
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presumption that al-Kidd had conceded individualized suspicion existed.98  
The majority applied this presumption to deny an inquiry into the 
programmatic purpose underlying the use of the material witness warrant 
and reject al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim.99  In rejecting the unusual 
status of the material witness statute in the criminal justice system, the 
majority was able to situate its analysis squarely inside Whren.100  
According to the majority, individualized suspicion accompanying a 
warrant grants stronger protection than many cases where a warrant is not 
required but inquiry into purpose is prohibited.101  However, inquiry into 
programmatic purpose is the only way to directly confront pretextual 
motivations and thus prevent such pretext from imposing an identity of 
criminality through conflation of witnesses with criminal suspects.102 
The failure of the government to establish individualized suspicion was 
central to al-Kidd’s allegations against the government because al-Kidd 
argued that the only individualized suspicion was of him being a criminal 
suspect and not of him being a material witness.103  In making a similar 
point, Justice Ginsburg contended that the majority’s use of the word 
suspicion was unprecedented because it referred to suspicion only that a 
person had witnessed a crime but not that the person was engaged in any 
wrongdoing.104  In Illinois v. Lidster, the Court reached the same 
conclusion by holding that detentions for the purpose of seeking 
98. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(engaging in a lengthy discussion about the particular legal meaning of “suspicion” 
being limited to “suspicion of wrongdoing”). 
99. See id. at 2082-83 (majority opinion) (determining that only a lack of
individualized suspicion permitted eschewing Whren’s prohibition on inquiry into 
subjective motivation and that al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim therefore had no 
basis). 
 100.  See id. at 2082 (finding Whren’s prohibition on inquiry into subjective 
motivation to be controlling after dismissing any special needs exception due to the 
presumed existence of individualized suspicion). 
 101.  See id. (appealing to cases, including Terry v. Ohio, where an objective 
standard is applied to warrantless searches based on a lesser showing of reasonable 
suspicion). 
 102.  Cf. Ronald L. Carlson, Distorting Due Process for Noble Purposes: The 
Emasculation of America’s Material Witness Laws, 42 GA. L. REV. 941, 957 (2008) 
(asserting that the pretextual use of the material witness statute to arrest criminal 
suspects blurs the necessary and important distinction between witness and criminal 
suspect). 
 103.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (describing the policy alleged by al-Kidd as 
arresting suspected terrorists who were never intended to be used as actual witnesses). 
 104.  See id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that all prior 
decisions used the term suspicion to mean a suspicion of wrongdoing). 
17
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information did not involve suspicion of the detained individual.105  Given 
the unprecedented application of the word suspicion to apply to witnesses, 
the use of the material witness statute to detain persons is unique, and the 
issue of its pretextual use is novel.106  Because the majority presupposed 
individualized suspicion, it was able to avoid analyzing the Fourth 
Amendment claim or its effect on al-Kidd with the necessary complexity.107 
3. Because al-Kidd’s Treatment Exemplifies the Excesses in the Use of the
Material Witness Statute, the Court Should Not Have Ignored the Alleged 
Abuse al-Kidd Suffered While Incarcerated. 
The conditions of al-Kidd’s confinement are a separate issue from al-
Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim, and even the Ninth Circuit rejected al-
Kidd’s claim against Ashcroft for the abusive treatment of his 
incarceration.108  The Ninth Circuit, however, also determined that the 
government has an obligation to not treat detained witnesses the same as it 
treats criminals who are incarcerated for punishment.109  Justice Ginsburg 
lends support to the Ninth Circuit’s view, finding no legitimate basis for the 
harsh conditions al-Kidd faced while confined.110  Justice Ginsburg 
 105.  In Lidster, the Court upheld a vehicle stop at a checkpoint because the 
checkpoint was to ask for the public’s help in providing information about a crime.  See 
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004).  The information-seeking stop differed 
from the invalid stop in Edmond, where the primary purpose was to “determine 
whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime.”  Id.  The Court found 
individualized suspicion to be largely irrelevant in cases involving detentions of 
potential witnesses.  Id. at 424-25.  The concurrence in part and dissent in part rejected 
the analysis of the checkpoint stop’s reasonableness, questioning the degree of and 
rationale for the interference with individual liberty.  See id. at 428-29 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recommending remand on the issue of the 
reasonableness of the checkpoint since the factual issue had not been addressed yet by 
lower courts). 
 106.  Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(criticizing the disposition of the novel Fourth Amendment claim); see also id. at 2090 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the Court never previously 
addressed a Fourth Amendment claim where the detained individual was not suspected 
of committing any crime). 
 107.  See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the various 
factual difficulties that the majority avoids through its use of presumptions). 
 108.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 957, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing al-
Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim from his Fifth Amendment claim against his custodial 
conditions, and rejecting Ashcroft’s liability under the Fifth Amendment claim for a 
failure to allege adequate facts to show personal involvement). 
 109.  See id. at 977 (requiring the government to recognize an important distinction 
between the punishment of criminals and the detention of witnesses). 
 110.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(criticizing al-Kidd’s custodial conditions when his detainment was meant to secure his 
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presents her concern as one related to the legality of the government’s use 
of the material witness statute.111  Even if the incarceration conditions of a 
material witness cannot be directly challenged by use of the Fourth 
Amendment, the majority should have considered the claims to inform its 
determination of whether the Fourth Amendment was applicable in its 
usual sense.  The conditions of incarceration—and the sense of difference 
for what is appropriate for a witness compared to a criminal—emphasize 
the uniqueness of the material witness statute. 112 
Although al-Kidd was not arrested on suspicion of criminal activity, he 
was treated in a manner that was worse than the criminals incarcerated in 
the same facilities.113  During his sixteen days of incarceration, al-Kidd was 
kept in the high-security units of three facilities and strip searched multiple 
times.114  He was confined almost entirely to his cell, allowed out only one 
to two hours a day, and, when transferred between facilities, was 
handcuffed and restrained with shackles around his wrists, legs, and 
waist.115  Both the Ninth Circuit and a minority of the Supreme Court 
condemned the treatment of al-Kidd, and Justice Ginsburg described his 
incarceration as “brutal.”116 
Al-Kidd has not been the only material witness to face harsh treatment 
during his period of confinement, and similar allegations of witness 
mistreatment surfaced soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.117  For example, in September 2001, federal agents arrested Osama 
Awadallah as a material witness, and he was immediately placed into 
solitary confinement.118  In circumstances similar to those alleged by al-
                                                          
testimony). 
 111.  See id. (building on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence regarding questions 
unaddressed by the majority, while emphasizing that the issue is one of the legality of 
the government’s use of the material witness statute). 
 112.  This is especially important to the negative repercussions on the arrested 
witness and on that witness’s ability to constitute an identity as a non-criminal. 
 113.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 953 (noting that al-Kidd’s cell was the only one 
kept lit twenty-four hours a day). 
 114.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(criticizing the conditions of al-Kidd’s confinement, which included several body-
cavity inspections, as similar to criminal punishment). 
115.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 953. 
 116.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(concluding that al-Kidd’s treatment expresses a disrespect for human dignity that must 
be constrained). 
 117.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 978 (noting criticisms of witness detention 
practices from news outlets as early as December 2001 and later from courts). 
 118.  See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(reciting the uncontested circumstances of Awadallah’s incarceration, including regular 
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Kidd, the district court noted that Awadallah’s incarceration was more 
restrictive than most of the criminals held in the same facilities.119  The 
incarcerations of Awadallah and al-Kidd were not isolated incidents, and an 
Assistant United States Attorney even expressed his frustration to the 
Office of the Inspector General that the Bureau of Prisons did not 
distinguish between terrorism suspects and material witnesses.120  The OIG 
Report concluded that the government engaged in a policy of mistreating 
material witnesses, at least of those incarcerated at the New York 
Metropolitan Detention Center.121 
These issues regarding incarceration of material witnesses should be 
taken into account to appreciate the implications of the majority’s analysis 
in al-Kidd because of the severe privacy intrusions they impose on 
witnesses.122  The Ninth Circuit criticized similar treatment of witness and 
criminals during confinement because of the uniqueness of the authority of 
the government to detain witnesses through incarceration.123  The court 
found an obligation of the government to not treat witnesses like criminals 
when the government is empowered to detain those who are not suspected 
of a crime.124  The potential for undermining the purpose of the statute in 
obtaining witness cooperation through harsh detention treatment further 
emphasizes the unique status of material witness arrests.125  These Fifth 
Amendment issues cannot be directly challenged using the Fourth 
Amendment, but they should inform any analysis of Fourth Amendment 
claims regarding the legality of material witness detentions because they 
are the direct impact of those detentions.126 
strip searches and videotaping whenever he was removed from his cell). 
 119.  See id. (distinguishing Awadallah’s treatment as a material witness from other 
prisoners with respect to family visits, phone calls, and shower access). 
 120.  See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 
11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, at
20 (2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT] (noting an Assistant United States Attorney’s 
complaint over his lack of input into the detentions of detainees). 
 121.  See id. at 197 (determining that insufficient inspections prevented a conclusion 
that a similar pattern of abuse existed at the other facility investigated). 
 122.  Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
judgment) (implying that the majority’s disposition of the Fourth Amendment issue 
avoided implementing safeguards against future witness mistreatment). 
123.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009). 
124.  Id. 
 125.  Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(questioning treatment that punishes witnesses when the purpose of the incarceration is 
to obtain testimony). 
126.  See id. (explaining that the treatment of al-Kidd impacts the legality of the use 
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4. The Court Should Have Considered the Alleged Policies of Ashcroft in
Reaching Its Fourth Amendment Determination Because These Policies 
Were the Basis for al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment Claim. 
Al-Kidd based his challenge to his arrest and detention on the specific 
policies he alleged Ashcroft implemented after the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.127  These alleged policies were in response to the threat of 
terrorism and were meant to enhance the government’s ability to combat 
that threat.128  The majority, however, failed to discuss these policies and 
did not mention the context of terrorism in its Fourth Amendment 
analysis.129  Instead, the majority limited its Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness analysis to exclude consideration of these central issues.130 
Al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft implemented policies after September 11, 
2001, that used the material witness statute to detain terrorism suspects for 
whom the government could not satisfy probable cause to arrest for 
criminal activity.131  Relying on quotes from Executive Branch officials, al-
Kidd alleged that Ashcroft’s policies violated the material witness statute 
by ignoring the requirement of impracticability in securing testimony 
without incarceration.132  Al-Kidd also disputed the materiality of the 
detained witnesses by identifying low rates of material witnesses’ 
testimony in trials and a statement by a government official that admitted 
that material witnesses may have no useful information.133  Al-Kidd then 
applied these allegations to his own situation to show that the government 
of the material witness statute). 
 127.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954 (describing al-Kidd’s allegations against 
Ashcroft as premised on an asserted policy to pretextually detain terrorism suspects by 
using the material witness statute for investigatory functions). 
 128.  See id. (citing al-Kidd’s complaint that quotes Ashcroft as using the aggressive 
detention of material witnesses to prevent new terrorist attacks). 
 129.  See generally al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079-83 (discussing only briefly the 
alleged policies implemented by Ashcroft and failing to mention the word “terror” or 
any of its derivations during its Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 130.  See id. at 2083 (holding that Whren prohibits inquiry into motivating intent 
underlying material witness arrests). 
 131.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954 (reciting the evidence in al-Kidd’s complaint, 
including a quote by Ashcroft and an internal Department of Justice memorandum that 
both suggested that the material witness statute would be used as part of aggressive 
detention tactics against terrorism suspects). 
 132.  See id. at 955 (identifying direct evidence in al-Kidd’s complaint that the 
government used the material witness statute to arrest individuals for investigatory 
purposes rather than to produce testimony). 
 133.  See id. at 975 (noting that possibly half of all material witnesses were never 
called to testify and that at least one government official was aware of the possibility 
that material witnesses would not be useful in an investigation). 
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detained him as a material witness only as a pretext for investigating 
suspicions of involvement in terrorism.134 
The Supreme Court, however, did not address these factual allegations, 
but instead dismissed inquiry into the intent behind material witness arrests 
by relying on Whren.135  The majority used al-Kidd’s presumed concession 
of individualized suspicion to foreclose any inquiry into the alleged 
pretextual motivation.136  In the course of its analysis, the majority did not 
once mention the alleged policies, despite al-Kidd’s reliance on those 
policies to challenge the validity of the warrant and the presumed existence 
of individualized suspicion.137 
The majority’s analysis thus foreclosed the possibility of consideration 
of the central claims of al-Kidd’s complaint.138  The majority relied on 
presumptions and the omission of details to resolve the case squarely under 
precedent even though the facts presented a far more complex situation.139  
Additionally, the failure of the Supreme Court to mention the context of 
terrorism allowed for an expansive impact of the Fourth Amendment 
analysis that is seemingly meant to affect all material witness arrests 
without regard to the circumstances of the arrest.140  As a consequence, the 
criminal stigma imposed on witnesses by pretextual arrests may be 
expansive but has no redress under the Fourth Amendment. 
 134.  See id. at 955, 963 (establishing an investigatory purpose by relying on the 
circumstances of his arrest, such as interrogations unrelated to Al-Hussayen, and also 
FBI Director Robert Mueller’s identification of al-Kidd’s arrest as a success in the fight 
against terrorism). 
 135.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (holding motivating intent is irrelevant for 
the Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 136.  See id. at 2082 (holding that a finding of individualized suspicion provides 
sufficient protection to avoid going beyond an analysis of objective reasonableness). 
 137.  Compare id. at 2080-83 (dismissing al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim while 
not mentioning Ashcroft’s alleged policies), with id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring 
in judgment) (criticizing the majority’s presumptions and determining that the 
pretextual use of the material witness statute is a difficult question). 
 138.  See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing the 
majority for using presumptions to avoid factual difficulties). 
 139.  See id. at 2082 (majority opinion) (relying on Whren to dismiss al-Kidd’s 
claim).  But see id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (finding the issue 
to be novel and difficult but its presentation by the majority to have been artificial). 
 140.  See id. at 2083 (majority opinion) (applying the Fourth Amendment analysis 
broadly to all arrests pursuant to the material witness statute). 
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B. Material Witness Arrests Should Be Considered Special Needs Seizures 
Because Their Unusual and Less Protected Legal Status Demands that 
Impermissible Programmatic Purposes Be Prohibited. 
Material witness arrests are special needs seizures because they go 
beyond the ordinary needs of criminal law enforcement.141  Although a 
seizure may be incidentally related to a general interest in crime control, 
the primary purpose must go beyond the ordinary enterprise of 
investigating crimes.142  Seizures that are meant to procure witness 
testimony are not within the ordinary needs of criminal law enforcement 
because their investigatory intent is not directed at the person seized.143  By 
application of the special needs exception, material witnesses can avoid 
pretextual arrests and the resultant stigma of criminality. 
1. The Unique Incarceration of Persons Based Solely on Their Witness to a
Crime Converts Material Witness Arrests into Special Needs Seizures. 
Material witness arrests, like the seizures of witnesses in other contexts, 
do not involve suspicion that the detained individual committed or is 
committing a crime.144  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit relied on the distinction 
between seizures of criminal suspects and seizures of witnesses to find the 
arrest of al-Kidd unconstitutional.145  The concurring justices on the 
Supreme Court agreed that warrants obtained under the material witness 
statute were unique because they did not rely upon probable cause that the 
individual had committed a crime.146  The majority’s analysis is therefore 
 141.  Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 (2001) (prohibiting special 
needs exceptions when the primary objective governmental purpose is to generate 
evidence for use by law enforcement). 
 142.  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43-44 (2000) (prohibiting 
checkpoints to search for evidence of narcotics, although recognizing that the 
immediate hazard to public safety allows for checkpoints designed to stop drunk 
drivers). 
 143.  See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (recognizing the significant distinction between targeting an 
individual for suspicion of a crime and targeting an individual for information about a 
crime committed by another). 
 144.  Cf. id. at 424 (majority opinion) (holding that seizures meant to seek 
information about a crime not performed by the seized person go beyond the ordinary 
needs of law enforcement). 
 145.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
pretextual use of the material witness statute to investigate suspects without a showing 
of probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 146.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding 
that the standard for obtaining material witness arrest warrants is atypical because 
witnesses are not criminal suspects). 
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flawed because it does not recognize its reliance on a reinterpretation of the 
word “suspicion” that allows it to ignore the unusual status of a material 
witness arrest as not dependent upon ordinary probable cause.147 
The majority in al-Kidd relied upon three erroneous assumptions to 
determine that the special needs exception does not apply to material 
witness arrests.  First, the majority interpreted Edmond as approving 
checkpoints for general crime control purposes that were based upon 
merely some quantum of individualized suspicion.148  Second, the majority 
broadly interpreted the term “suspicion” to go beyond suspicion that an 
individual has committed or is committing a crime.149  Finally, the majority 
presumed that al-Kidd conceded the existence of individualized suspicion 
and thus precluded himself from challenging pretextual use of the material 
witness statute.150 
The foundational premise of the majority’s argument, that some quantum 
of individualized suspicion will sufficiently justify a seizure to prevent 
inquiry into motivating intent, is a misinterpretation of the analysis in 
Edmond.151  The majority asserted that the Court in Edmond would approve 
checkpoint stops based upon any amount of individualized suspicion even 
though the purpose was a general interest in crime control.152  The majority 
then erroneously concludes that the lack of a general seizure scheme 
undertaken without individualized suspicion prohibits the consideration of 
programmatic purposes.153  However, the Court in Edmond only expressed 
that such a conclusion may be permissible and not that a prohibition on 
programmatic purpose was certain.154  Al-Kidd’s majority therefore 
 147.  See id. at 2081 (majority opinion) (relying on Edmond’s approval of 
checkpoints for general crime control purposes that are based on individualized 
suspicion to reject inquiry into motivating intent). 
 148.  See id. (ignoring the context of a statement made in Edmond and introducing 
the word “merely” to change its meaning). 
 149.  See id. at 2082 n.2 (arguing that the term “suspicion” must be understood to 
have a common and idiomatic meaning, rather than a particular legal one). 
 150.  See id. at 2083 (holding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because 
the arrest was objectively justified). 
 151.  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (holding that the 
constitutionality of a checkpoint scheme depends on the balancing of competing 
interests). 
 152.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (interpreting Edmond as making a 
determinate holding regarding a hypothetical situation that was not before the Court in 
Edmond). 
 153.  See id. at 2082 (concluding that the existence of individualized suspicion 
prohibits an analysis under the special needs exception). 
 154.  Compare id. at 2081 (“Edmond explicitly said that it would approve 
checkpoint stops for ‘general crime control purposes’ that were based upon merely 
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interprets Edmond’s permissive attitude towards consideration of 
programmatic purpose in analyzing Fourth Amendment seizures to be an 
absolute one that permits this consideration only when the seizure is 
undertaken without generalized suspicion.155  The majority’s approach 
modifies Edmond by inferring an “only” in a sentence, which effectively 
distorts the actual holding.156  Individualized suspicion may justify a 
seizure sufficiently to prohibit inquiry into individualized suspicion, but 
that does not mean that any quantum of individualized suspicion will 
inevitably justify such a seizure.157 
The majority proceeds to use this interpretation of Edmond as the basis 
upon which its interpretation of the term “suspicion” and of al-Kidd’s 
complaint prohibit an inquiry into the alleged policies implemented by 
Ashcroft.158  These latter two interpretations are intertwined because the 
majority asserts that the term “suspicion” includes suspicion that one is a 
witness in a criminal investigation and then infers that al-Kidd conceded 
that such suspicion must exist.159  Justice Ginsburg, however, disputes that 
the use of the term “suspicion” in legal discourse has the same meaning as 
its use in common parlance.160  Further, Justice Ginsburg questions the 
validity of the warrant on the basis that the individualized reasons provided 
in the affidavit accompanying the warrant application were undermined by 
omissions and misrepresentations.161  Without these assumptions by the 
‘some quantum of individualized suspicion.’”), with Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 (“When 
law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at 
checkpoints . . .  stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized 
suspicion.”). 
 155.  See id. at 2081 (effectively interpreting the statement in Edmond that purpose 
“may be relevant” when a seizure is without individualized suspicion to mean that 
purpose may be relevant only in such a situation). 
 156.  Cf. id. at 2083 (criticizing al-Kidd for making this same error in his 
interpretation of Whren). 
 157.  See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 457 (asserting that individualized suspicion is 
required but not necessarily sufficient to justify a checkpoint based on primarily 
general crime control purposes). 
 158.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2082-83 (applying the presumed existence of 
individualized suspicion to reject consideration of the allegedly pretextual use of the 
material witness statute). 
 159.  See id. at 2082 (inferring al-Kidd’s concession of individualized suspicion 
from the fact that the warrant application gave individualized reasons to believe al-
Kidd was a material witness). 
 160.  See id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (providing extensive 
case law to show that the phrase “individualized suspicion” has been exclusively used 
to refer to suspicion of wrongdoing).  
 161.  See id. (debating the assumption of a valid material witness warrant as well as 
the propriety of a merits determination). 
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majority, strong cause exists to believe that the material witness statute 
should undergo analysis under the special needs exception.162 
Based on the rationale of Lidster, the seizure of witnesses using the 
material witness statute should be considered a special needs exception.163  
Witness detentions differ greatly from the situation in Edmond, where the 
Court held unconstitutional the suspicionless detention of individuals for 
drug possession because the seizures did not satisfy any special needs 
exception.164  Although material witness arrests do not involve suspicion of 
a crime, these detentions should be permitted as exceptions to the general 
dictates of the Fourth Amendment and allowed to advance important law 
enforcement objectives.165  In Lidster, the Court recognized the importance 
of witness detentions in certain circumstances, and thus applied the special 
needs doctrine to allow for this unusual situation, where information is 
collected through cooperation with noncriminal citizens.166  Similarly, the 
Court in al-Kidd should have recognized the distinctive aspects of material 
witness arrests, and permitted them only as pursuant to the special needs 
exception.167 
The appropriateness of the application of the special needs exception to 
the material witness statute is evident through the uniqueness and rarity of 
its occurrence in law enforcement activity.168  Instead of stopping an 
individual for suspicion of a crime, the person is being detained for having 
information about a crime.169  Lower courts have thus rightly recognized 
 162.  Cf. al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 966-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (using the unusual status 
of material witness arrests to justify the application of the special needs exception and 
conclude that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred). 
 163.  Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004) (applying special needs 
analysis to detentions that have the purpose of obtaining information from witnesses as 
opposed to the purpose of incriminating the detained individual); see also supra note 
106 and accompanying text. 
 164.  See id. at 423 (distinguishing stops to obtain information from potential 
witnesses to a crime from the general interest in crime control found in Edmond). 
 165.  See id. at 427 (applying the special needs exception to motorist checkpoints 
because of the importance of the information-seeking activity). 
 166.  See id. at 424 (recognizing that information-seeking stops differ from law 
enforcement’s ordinary interest in crime control, which targets criminal suspects for 
investigation). 
 167.  Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting 
the atypical aspects of warrants and arrests under the material witness statute). 
 168.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 966 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) (observing that only 
3.6% of federal arrests are pursuant to the material witness statute, and only 0.3% of 
federal arrests outside the context of immigration are pursuant to the statute). 
 169.  See id. at 969 (recognizing the distinction between a witness and a criminal as 
central to analysis of material witnesses and thus permitting inquiry into programmatic 
intent). 
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the important distinction between detention of criminals and detention of 
material witnesses.170  Additionally, all four concurring justices on the 
Supreme Court agreed that material witness arrests are so unusual that they 
may not be covered by the Warrant Clause.171  The inapplicability of the 
Warrant Clause is a key aspect of special needs cases, as they often do not 
involve individualized suspicion.172  Without the element of criminality, 
and the corresponding requirement of probable cause for suspicion of a 
crime, the detention of witnesses is most adequately covered in our judicial 
system by application of the special needs exception.173  The special needs 
exception would then distinguish material witness arrests from ordinary 
criminal arrests and help allay the imputation of criminality. 
2. The Programmatic Purpose Behind Material Witness Arrests Must Be
Considered to Prevent Abuse of the Statute Because the Statute Is 
Particularly Vulnerable Given Its Special Needs. 
The material witness statute is vulnerable to abuse because it does not 
involve the ordinary suspicion of criminal activity that characterizes most 
law enforcement activity.174  The requirement of probable cause in the 
material witness statute does not afford the same protections as the 
requirement of probable cause for arrest of criminal suspects.175  Because 
ordinary probable cause already includes individualized suspicion of 
criminal involvement, an arrest warrant adequately based on ordinary 
probable cause could not, by definition, be used to pretextually arrest an 
individual for whom no ordinary probable cause to arrest existed.  
Conversely, the nature of the material witness statute, which is precisely 
meant to avoid the requirement of probable cause for suspicion of criminal 
 170.  See id. at 977 (admonishing the treatment of incarcerated witnesses as similar 
to the punishment of criminals through incarceration). 
 171.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that 
material arrest warrants are not issued on the basis of probable cause that the arrestee 
committed a crime). 
 172.  See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (comparing the permissible 
information-seeking stop to other special needs cases that did not involve 
individualized suspicion). 
 173.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 970 (allowing for consideration of programmatic 
purpose in material witness arrests due to the distinctive lack of probable cause for 
suspicion of criminal activity). 
 174.  See id. (noting the inapplicability of ordinary probable cause to material 
witness arrests and warrants and recognizing a resultant susceptibility to pretextual 
use). 
 175.  See id. at 968 (finding that probable cause to arrest material witnesses has 
similar procedural protections to ordinary probable cause, but that it still does not 
satisfy the probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment). 
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activity, allows for the potential pretextual use to arrest criminal suspects 
for whom ordinary probable cause does not exist because the government 
has less to show.176  Additionally, the means of satisfying the probable 
cause requirements for a material witness arrest can be substantially easier 
to satisfy.177  Given these distinctive aspects regarding material witness 
arrests, consideration of programmatic purposes would allow for an inquiry 
into the heightened possibility of misuse.178 
A prohibition on inquiry into programmatic purpose behind the use of 
the material witness statute makes the statute vulnerable to misuse.179  As 
the majority in al-Kidd admits, seizures unaccompanied by suspicion of 
wrongdoing are a rare occurrence and thus are frequently unaddressed by 
courts.180  The lack of judicial precedent further compounds the difficulties 
inherent in determining the practicality of securing witness testimony by 
subpoena or deposition.181  Further compounding the problem is the lack of 
judicial supervision required for the issuance of subpoenas.182  As a 
consequence of these difficulties, judges rarely, if ever, deny a request for a 
material witness warrant when related to the context of terrorism.183  
Therefore, inquiry into the programmatic purpose behind material witness 
arrests is necessary to protect the Fourth Amendment and prevent abuse of 
the material witness statute. 
 176.  See id. at 970 (observing the vulnerability of the material witness statute to 
pretextual use to arrest criminal suspects for whom ordinary probable cause does not 
exist). 
 177.  See Bacon v. United States, 440 F.2d 933, 943 (1971) (holding that, for grand 
jury proceedings, the mere assertion by a federal prosecutor will satisfy the probable 
cause requirement for the materiality of the witness). 
 178.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 968-70 (rejecting Whren’s prohibition on inquiry 
into programmatic purpose because of the lack of ordinary probable cause in material 
witness arrests and the potential for misuse). 
 179.  See Kit Kinports, Camreta and al-Kidd: The Supreme Court, the Fourth 
Amendment, and Witnesses, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 288 (2012) (noting 
the possibility for recurring instances of abuse due to the lack of judicial oversight). 
 180.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2082 n.2 (commenting on the lack of case law 
using the word “suspicion” without meaning suspicion of wrongdoing). 
 181.  Cf. id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the 
uncertain scope of the statute’s lawful use). 
 182.  Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Material Witness Detentions After al-Kidd, 100 KY.
L.J. 293, 322 (2012) (asserting that the goal of material witness arrests is unrelated to 
ordinary law enforcement because of the manner that subpoenas are issued). 
 183.  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 45 (2005), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/us0605.pdf (finding no instances of a court 
denying a government application for a material witness warrant in connection with 
September 11, 2001). 
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Consideration of the programmatic purpose behind the arrest of al-Kidd, 
based on the allegations contained in al-Kidd’s complaint, would result in a 
finding that al-Kidd’s arrest was improper.184  The government may not use 
the material witness statute to avoid the Fourth Amendment requirements 
of probable cause for the arrest of criminal suspects.185  Al-Kidd’s 
complaint presented numerous instances of statements by government 
officials that the material witness statute was being used to arrest suspected 
terrorists for whom ordinary probable cause could not be established, 
including statements about al-Kidd specifically.186  Pretextual use of the 
material witness statute goes beyond its limited use under the special needs 
exception because this use serves the ordinary needs of law enforcement 
instead of the distinctive purpose of securing witness testimony.187  
Consequently, although al-Kidd’s claim against Ashcroft was barred due to 
qualified immunity, the policy implemented by Ashcroft and the 
subsequent arrest of al-Kidd pursuant to that policy were 
unconstitutional.188 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Justice Should Require Consideration of How Social Meaning, 
Especially Stigma, Affects the Dignity of Material Witnesses. 
Dignity is dependent upon respect within one’s community, and 
especially respect for one’s self-determination of individual identity.189  
The actions of the state and the perceptions of society are intimately 
intertwined with the expression of dignity because identity is a concrete 
notion constituted by a particular historical context.190  The attitude of 
 184.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the pretextual 
use of the material witness statute to arrest criminal suspects violates the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 185.  See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting in dicta 
that the government cannot use the material witness statute to arrest suspected 
criminals for whom probable cause cannot be established). 
 186.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 963-64 (summarizing the allegations made by al-
Kidd and concluding that, if true, they were objective indicia of an impermissible 
investigative or preemptive detention). 
 187.  See id. at 969 (holding that the use of the material witness statute for a criminal 
investigatory purpose violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 188.  Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S Ct. 2074, 2090 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
judgment) (stating that the Court did not decide whether the pretextual use of the 
material witness statute was lawful, but only that Ashcroft was qualifiedly immune). 
 189.  See Rao, supra note 55, at 188 (arguing for an understanding of dignity as 
based on the expression of one’s self-identity). 
190.  See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 17 (utilizing consent to argue for a conception of 
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one’s community, which importantly includes the attitudes of the state as 
expressed by the law, thus has a vital role in the constitution of self-
identity.191  The law takes part in the constitution of the self.  Given the 
broad and various ways that the law affects and takes part in our lives, the 
law can be seen as a significant aspect of who one is.  If social meaning, 
therefore—and the contributions to it by the law—are central to 
establishing a dignified identity, then justice demands its consideration in 
judicial analysis.192 
Material witnesses are especially vulnerable to the imputation of 
negative social meaning because of their unusual treatment in the legal 
system.193  While arrest and incarceration can be stigmatizing on its own, 
arrest and incarceration with the implication that one is involved in 
criminality is far more stigmatizing, and thus damaging to personal agency 
in creating one’s own sense of identity.  The feminist concern with the 
effect of social meaning on the constitution of identity can help address 
limited consideration of the social context of judicial processes.194  
Feminism has been used to explore the impacts of social meaning on 
women by relying on critical factual inquiry and the discovery and 
rejection of unsupported presuppositions.  This same critical perspective 
can provide a more appreciative analysis of the impact of Fourth 
Amendment analysis on material witnesses.195 
The increasing use of dignity in Supreme Court decisions can be seen as 
a signal of the consideration of social meaning in legal analysis.196  In 
particular, the Court has shown an implicit concern with stigmatizing social 
meaning when dealing with Fourth Amendment analysis.197  Justifications 
the self that is shaped by society and the state). 
 191.  See Rao, supra note 55, at 188 (relying on defamation and hate speech laws to 
argue for the respect required for expression of dignity). 
 192.  See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 79 (concluding that a social meaning inquiry 
improves reasonableness balancing in Fourth Amendment analysis and helps ensure 
justice). 
 193.  See Oliver, supra note 182, at 316 (providing historical background of public 
and statutory approval of detaining criminal suspects as material witnesses). 
 194.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 
837 (1990) (utilizing feminist theory to question the impact on women of not 
considering gender implications in apparently neutral practices). 
 195.  Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (relying on the distinctiveness 
of witness questioning to distinguish an information-seeking checkpoint from other 
checkpoints). 
 196.  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (using 
dignity as a constitutive aspect of meaning to uphold a woman’s right to choose 
whether to terminate a pregnancy). 
197.  See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 77 (arguing that the stigma attached to drug-
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based on unwarranted stigma certainly have a basis in Supreme Court 
precedent in contexts such as racial discrimination.198  These concerns 
about social meaning should be considered in Fourth Amendment analysis 
of material witness arrests because the dignity of witnesses is at risk when 
the stigma of criminality is imparted to the mere status of being a witness 
to a crime.199 
B. Arrests of Material Witnesses Should Be Considered Special Needs 
Exceptions, Rather Than Satisfying the Ordinary Needs of Criminal Law 
Enforcement, to Avoid Stigmatization of Witnesses as Criminals. 
The judicial treatment of material witnesses like criminals contains the 
threat of conflating the status of being a witness with being involved in 
criminality.200  The decision of the Court in al-Kidd undermined a crucial 
avenue for avoiding the stigmatization of material witnesses by removing 
the possibility for inquiry into pretextual use of the material witness statute 
to detain suspects as witnesses.201  Pursuant to the majority’s dicta that 
excluded special needs analysis of material witness arrests, the government 
would be permitted to detain criminal suspects by arresting them as 
witnesses.202  The arrest of individuals with no means to distinguish 
between those arrested for merely being witnesses and those arrested for 
being criminal suspects would reinforce the popular negative attitude 
against all those who are arrested.203 
Material witness arrests should be analyzed under the special needs 
exception because the stigma of criminality should not be imparted to the 
using mothers explains the difference in outcomes between Ferguson and Edmond). 
 198.  See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (holding separate 
educational facilities to be unconstitutional because of the feeling of inferiority 
imparted on black students). 
 199.  Cf. Studnicki, supra note 57, at 1565 (arguing for the importance of ethical 
considerations in the context of material witnesses due to the distinctive use of 
government power to arrest those who are not suspected of criminal activity). 
 200.  See Carlson, supra note 102, at 972 (urging a strong judicial declaration 
separating the statuses of witness and defendant). 
 201.  Cf. Taslitz, supra note 55, at 30 (arguing that government objectives that are 
less stigmatizing should be considered under the special needs exception). 
 202.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2075, 2083 (2011) (asserting that the pretextual use 
of the material witness statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 203.  See Oliver, supra note 182, at 317 (finding that the public was historically 
most tolerant of the use of material witness statutes to pretextually arrest criminal 
suspects).  The point in this Article is that the historical tolerance of the pretextual use 
of material witness statutes and the legacy of that perception need to be challenged to 
validate the use of material witness arrests as respective of individual liberty and 
dignity. 
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status of being a witness.204  By rejecting a special needs analysis, the 
majority effectively asserted that material witness arrests are part of the 
ordinary needs of law enforcement.205  However, material witness arrests 
do not have a general law enforcement purpose but rather serve the 
distinctive special need of securing witness testimony.206  The majority 
ignored the unusual status of material witnesses by situating its analysis 
within the context of Whren’s prohibition on inquiry into programmatic 
purposes.207  Appreciation of the uniqueness of material witness arrests 
under the special needs doctrine would allow for a more sufficient 
consideration of the factual allegations concerning the programmatic 
purpose underlying al-Kidd’s arrest.208  With consideration of the alleged 
policy implemented by Ashcroft, the stigma of criminality imparted to 
material witnesses such as al-Kidd could be avoided, at least in significant 
part, because criminal suspects could not be pretextually detained as 
material witnesses, and especially not as part of an official policy. 
In a larger context, the application of feminist theory suggests that a 
purpose that stigmatizes the target of a seizure should be considered a 
criminal law enforcement purpose.209  If the Supreme Court explicitly 
embraced such an understanding, then law enforcement officers would be 
incentivized to avoid stigmatizing material witnesses through pretextual 
policies.210  Combining this incentive for law enforcement with judicial 
precedent that respects the dignity of witnesses to constitute their own 
identity separate from criminality would allow the application of the 
special needs exception to uphold the important status of being a witness. 
 204.  Cf. Taslitz, supra note 55, at 77 (arguing that the social stigma attached to 
drug-abusing pregnant women most appropriately identifies the search for drug abuse 
evidence as a criminal matter instead of an administrative one). 
 205.  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001) (identifying the 
distinguishing factor of special needs cases as going beyond a general interest in crime 
control). 
 206.  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) 
(showing the unusual use of the word “suspicion” when applied to material witnesses 
since witnesses are not suspected of a crime but rather supply testimony). 
 207.  See id. at 2082 (majority opinion) (relying on a presumption of individualized 
suspicion to reject the application of special needs analysis). 
 208.  Cf. id. at 2083 (rejecting inquiry into the alleged programmatic purposes 
because of the reliance on Whren). 
 209.  See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 30 (positing that social meaning is the most 
significant factor in determining whether the primary objective purpose of a search or 
seizure is ordinary criminal law enforcement or administrative). 
 210.  See id. at 37 (arguing that the Court implicitly embraced the importance of 
social meaning and stigmatization in distinguishing Ferguson from similar earlier 
cases). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The unprecedented use of the material witness statute to preemptively 
detain terrorism suspects for whom ordinary probable cause to arrest 
cannot be established demands judicial action that distinguishes mere 
witnesses from criminal defendants.211  Analysis under the special needs 
exception allows for this legal distinction because the consideration of 
programmatic purpose would prohibit the pretextual use of the material 
witness statute to arrest criminal suspects as an official policy.212  The 
majority in al-Kidd, however, did not exhibit sufficient appreciation for 
either the allegations made by al-Kidd or the unique status of the material 
witness statute and thus failed to reach the appropriate conclusion 
regarding the allegations of pretext.  As a result, the stigma of criminality 
may be easily imparted upon mere witnesses without redress because an 
inquiry into misuse of the material witness statute is prohibited. 
The majority’s failure in al-Kidd to consider the alleged pretextual use of 
the material witness statute was not only misguided on the basis of 
precedent, but the possible import of stigma on witnesses undermines the 
important value placed on witness cooperation.  The special needs line of 
cases provides precisely the necessary analysis to effectively distinguish 
between a witness and a criminal suspect by allowing for consideration of 
programmatic purpose underlying a scheme of arrests.  With the threat of 
imparting unwarranted stigma onto material witnesses, justice requires that 
a deeper inquiry into underlying motivations be permitted for material 
witness arrests. 
 211.  See Carlson, supra note 102, at 972 (urging a vigorous distinction by the 
federal judiciary between criminal suspects and material witnesses). 
 212.  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the special 
needs exception to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment in Ashcroft’s alleged 
policy of pretextually using the material witness statute). 
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